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Introduction
Following decades of decline, the once-great Ottoman Empire was dismantled in
the aftermath of World War I by the victorious Triple Entente. In the Turkish War
of Independence, Turkish nationalists under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk defeated the
occupying forces from the Triple Entente and created the Republic of Turkey in
the heart of what was once the Ottoman Empire. The new government rejected the
Ottoman fusion of Islam and politics and established a policy of secularization
known as laiklik based on the French model of laïcité which aimed to completely
separate religion and politics in Turkish society.1 The resulting ideology
developed into what became known as Kemalism and was codified in the Turkish
constitution to become the civil religion of Turkey followed by subsequent
political leaders and used by the military on multiple occasions to remove
governments deemed to be Islamist.2 Given the role which civil religion plays in
the development of the values and political culture of a society, Turkey provides
an interesting case in examining the way in which national values are created and
advanced. This paper will argue that the secular civil religion of Turkey is
primarily an instrument used by the state to advance national interests, rather than
any commitment to women’s rights or democratic ideals.
The first section of this paper will provide a brief history of the study of
national civil religions and develop a working definition, which can be applied
specifically to Turkey. The second section will review the literature on the role
secularism plays in Turkish society and report on the role that various groups
have had in supporting or opposing its influence. The third section will analyze
the role of secularism in Turkish society and bring in additional research about
how secularism is used by the state. The final section will bring together the
research and analysis to determine whether the thesis of this paper is supported or
not.

I. Civil Religion
The concept of civil religion was first described by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in The
Social Contract in which he described evidence of its existence back to the
earliest of human societies. The earliest human rulers controlled theocratic
systems of government, which granted legitimacy to the ruler by the divine will of
a deity or pantheon of deities. The presence of many distinct societies with their
1

James W. Warhola and Egemen B. Bezci, "Religion and State in Contemporary Turkey: Recent
Developments in Laiklik," Journal of Church and State 52, no. 3 (July 2010): 427-428.
2
Tolga Köker, "The Establishment of Kemalist Secularism in Turkey," Middle East Law and
Governance 2, no. 1 (2010): 20-26.
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own rulers, religious systems and legal systems led to a proliferation of gods over
each of those societies, each serving to unify a group of people. Rousseau argued
that the presence of a civil religion in every society raised obedience of laws to
the level of a moral duty, venerated those who died in service of the society as
martyrs and strengthened national cohesion as well as skepticism of outsiders.
With the rise of Christianity, however, civil religion took on a new quality by
enabling different nations within a larger state to unify behind a common belief
system.3 In his essay “Civil Religion in America”, sociologist Robert Bellah
argued that civil religion plays a vital role to the functioning of societies today,
and that understanding how it interacts in the society is as important as
understanding the role of any other religion.4 Bellah drew much of his evidence
from the way in which presidents of the United States have always referred to
“God” as an abstract entity without any connection to a specific religious sect or
creed, and that this usage of quasi-religious rhetoric is especially important in
addressing the nation during important ceremonial events.5
In contrast to ethnically and religiously homogenous European societies
which had a long history of religion underpinning and legitimizing secular rulers,
the United States was a pluralistic society of immigrants founded on the idea of a
separation between church and state which required a new conception of civil
religion to develop national unity.6 Bellah contrasts the character of civil religion
in the United States with the civil religion developed in France after the French
Revolution. In the United States, it took on general elements from the dominant
Protestant religious heritage and grew to include many different groups whereas
in France it radically rejected the country’s Catholic history in favor of a purely
secular model.7 Civil religion is based around the sacralization of secular concepts
and ideas, but the civil religion which developed in post-revolutionary France
expanded that to a concept of laïcité, a general term bringing together various
universal and abstract values such as liberty, equality and tolerance which should
be upheld by all people identifying as French.8 Due to its radical secularism which
bans religious symbols and teachings in public or political life, the French model
of civil religion provides the best comparison to that which exists in Turkey.9
The French idea of laïcité exists at the center of the French national
consciousness today, but went through a long period of struggle before achieving
3

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Amsterdam, 1762), 103-112, accessed November
10, 2013, http://www.ucc.ie/social_policy/Rousseau_contrat-social.pdf.
4
Robert N. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," Daedalus 134, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 40.
5
Ibid., 41-42.
6
Ibid., 44-46.
7
Ibid., 50-51.
8
Silvio Ferrari, "Civil Religions: Models and Perspectives," George Washington International
Law Review 41, no. 4 (2010): 751-752.
9
Ibid., 752-753.
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dominance, in much the same way as the Turkish idea of laiklik is struggling to
maintain its influence over Turkish society today. While ideas of radical
secularization began with the French Revolution, the term laïcité didn’t appear
until the 1880s as one of a number of competing views.10 As a push for
secularization, laïcité was more than simply a rejection of any state religion. Its
connection to the revolutionary ideals which broke the monarchy in France gave it
moral equivalency with a crusade against oppression, and allowed it to take on a
mythic dimension in French society as a quest for the “promised land” where
society could advance and freely progress.11
The foundations of Turkish civil religion were laid when Turkey separated
itself from its Ottoman history from May 19, 1919 to July 24, 1923 during the
Turkish War of Independence. After leading nationalist Turkish forces and
establishing the new government, Mustafa Kemal was given the surname Atatürk,
meaning “Father of Turk” to highlight his role as the central mythical figure in the
new civil religion.12 He established the modern Republic of Turkey based on a
secular Western model and secularism took a similar role in Turkey as it had in
France in distancing the society from the theocratic monarchy which preceded it
and created a new national identity. The new secular civil religion aimed to
undermine Islam’s role as the foundation of the state, education and law. Further,
by removing references to Islam from public life and “Turkifying” all societal and
cultural aspects, the new civil religion was to become the central element uniting
Turkish society.13
Kemalism, the cult of personality and ideology named after Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk, was developed as the cornerstone of the new Turkish identity as a
modern secular society and shows its namesake in public monuments, on currency
and as a popular figure whose sayings and ideas are still used today.14 Though
Kemalists have held leadership roles in Turkish society for most of Turkey’s
history, there have been opposition voices. The role of Kemalists in shaping the
development of laiklik in Turkish civil religion has been similar to how
intellectual elites in France were essential in the development and implementation
of laïcité in order to overcome societal resistance.15

10

Blandine Chelini-Pont, "Is Laïcité the Civil Religion of France?," George Washington
International Law Review 41, no. 4 (2010): 768.
11
Ibid., 771.
12
Talip Kucukcan, "Sacralization of the State and Secular Nationalism: Foundations of Civil
Religion in Turkey," George Washington International Law Review 41, no. 4 (2010): 963-964.
13
Ibid., 963-965.
14
Ibid., 966.
15
Ibid., 973.
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II. Secularism in Turkish Society
Karaveli explains in detail the makeup of Turkish political and civil society by
examining the similarities and differences among Kemalists, liberals, and Islamic
conservatives in order to gain a deeper perspective of the forces at work on the
civil religion. 16 He argues that the secular Kemalist leadership has ostracized both
liberals and Islamic conservatives since the Republic of Turkey was established in
the Turkish War of Independence. He argues that especially during the past
decade, this alliance has served to lend legitimacy to Islamic conservatism as a
democratic and liberal alternative to the state-centric secularism supported by
Kemalists. This legitimization of religious conservatism has also delegitimized
the liberal reformist credentials of the secular order due to increasing concerns
about individual rights in Turkish society.
The primary charge Karaveli identifies against Kemalists by liberals is that
the supposedly enlightened and modern ideology of Atatürk was being forced on
Turks by the government rather than existing as a movement in society pushing
for greater reforms and rights.17 The military’s use in the 1970s and 1980s of the
cult of personality surrounding Atatürk to support their repression and
intervention in society left behind a societal association between secularism and
state repression. Where Atatürk took significant inspiration from Western
intellectuals of the Enlightenment, later Kemalists refused to acknowledge these
outside influences on the ideology or pursue them deeper, instead comparing
Atatürk to authoritarian rulers claiming that Kemalism was the only one of those
to succeed. By refusing to acknowledge the intellectual ties between Atatürk and
the Western Enlightenment, Kemalists attempted to use Turkish nationalism to
build up a secular state in opposition to Western secularism.18
Karaveli cites sociologist Serif Mardin in identifying the root of the
problems with Turkish liberalism and secularism. Mardin noted that while
Western secularism advanced through the Enlightenment due to the contributions
of a number of different thinkers and reformers, the Turkish project begun under
Atatürk lacks further philosophers and advocates pushing to reform society and
religion.19 Karaveli notes several ways in which this development was hindered
including active removal of philosophy and other Western influences from the
educational curriculum, and the refusal of the Turkish government to implement
the educational vision and plans of Atatürk to this day. By refusing to create a
free-thinking generation of citizens, the Kemalists hoped to develop citizens who
16

Halil M. Karaveli, "An Unfulfilled Promise of Enlightenment: Kemalism and its Liberal
Critics," Turkish Studies 11, no. 1 (2010): 85-86.
17
Ibid., 86-87.
18
Ibid., 97-99.
19
Ibid., 89-93.
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would obediently serve the state without question, content in the rights which had
been granted to them by the state.20
Without the bottom-up push for reforms of society and religion as
happened in Christianity during the Enlightenment, Karaveli argues that citizens
were unsure of how to proceed in developing the society further, preventing the
tolerance of differences of opinion and diversity of beliefs which aided in the
organic secularization of Western societies. This failure of Islam to evolve
alongside secularism allowed religious conservatives to be painted as a liberal and
democratic alternative to Kemalism. The three groups which were created as a
result of these processes continue to dominate Turkish society and play an
important role in developing and interpreting the civil religion.21
In many ways paralleling the development of Kemalists, liberals, and
Islamic conservatives in Turkish society, Eslen-Ziya and Korkut describe the
development of feminist movements since the 1923 establishment of the current
Republic of Turkey. 22 They divide the feminist movement into several main
groups, which arose through processes of westernization and modernization. They
identify early feminist movements in the Ottoman Empire to have started in the
second half of the nineteenth century with the push for full recognition of the
rights of women continuing into the republic.
The establishment of the republic was a break from the state’s Islamic
religion of the past in favor of a new secular order. Instead of promoting that
secular order through the lens of democratic participation and equal rights,
however, they argue that it was a top-down project to forcibly remove the
previous state religion in favor of a set of ambiguously defined ideals of
secularism and Europeanization without the history and cultural context which
allowed the West to develop.23
The first phase of women’s movements in Turkey after independence was
represented by a group identified as “republican feminists”. The new Turkish state
sought to demonstrate its modernization by setting up a strict standard of
women’s rights in the model of European and Western states, while also
mandating Western norms of dress and restricting religious expression. This
model of feminism has been called “state feminism” due to the reliance of women
on the state as the guarantor of rights in society, especially against the old civil
religious order which had been replaced by republicanism.24
20

Ibid., 93-94.
Ibid., 99-100.
22
Hande Eslen-Ziya and Umut Korkut, "Political Religion and Politicized Women in Turkey:
Hegemonic Republicanism Revisited," Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 11, no. 3-4
(2010): 311-313.
23
Ibid., 315-316.
24
Ibid., 316-319.
21
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With the transition of Turkey from a single-party state to a democratic
society, republican state-feminists transitioned to holding allegiances for a
specific party and advocating planks of the party platform rather than a strictly
feminist agenda, still remaining reliant on the power of the party and state to
guarantee rights. As society continued the process of modernization, however,
liberal feminist movements developed in opposition to state apparatuses and
policies in the 1980s. The liberal feminists engaged in social activism and street
protests before moving on to organizing on university campuses and using NGOs
to affect change in issues such as domestic violence, marriage, divorce, and
abortion laws which republican feminists hadn’t been able to touch.25
The main split between liberal and republican feminists took place when
Islamist women’s movements began pushing for the right to wear the hijab in
public spaces. Republican feminists saw any return to traditional religious ways as
a threat to the secular society which had been built by the state, while liberal
feminists saw it as another opportunity to advance women’s rights, allowing
women to choose what to wear or not without having to worry about stateimposed regulation.26
With the major divisions identified within Turkish society and the feminist
movement, it is important to examine the external factors contributing to the
unique Turkish identity which binds them all together. Haynes argues that the
core of Turkey’s national identity is a xenophobic fear of outsiders, rather than
Islam or secularism specifically, and that the country’s unique position between
the western and eastern worlds has worked to accentuate this xenophobia.27 The
secular character of the Turkish republic has been guaranteed throughout its
history by the military, and it is unlikely that the Justice and Development Party
(AKP) or any other Islamist-influenced political group will be able to successfully
bring Islam back to the forefront of national policy.28
The importance of the military in the Turkish state goes back to Atatürk
who, after rising to prominence as a military hero, used the military to impose
modernization and secularization on Turkish society during his rule. Combining
the Ottoman centralized bureaucratic state with secular military authority created
a precedent which shaped Turkey’s development to this day. Only recently have
democratic values begun to establish themselves with any sort of consistency.
Through its institutional influence, the military has sought to restrict extremist,
Islamist, or separatist parties from gaining power in government. In spite of the

25

Ibid., 320-322.
Ibid., 323-326.
27
Jeffrey Haynes, "Politics, identity and religioius nationalism in Turkey: From Atatürk to the
AKP," Australian Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 3 (2010): 313.
28
Ibid., 314-315.
26
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military’s efforts, Turkey has developed a split between secularists and those who
would be in favor of more Islamization of the society.29
Alongside the secular/Islamist split in Turkish society is the division over
membership in the EU, in which Turkey is extremely critical of the West but
desires the opportunities for economic development which association gives.
Haynes cites a 2006 Pew Research study which shows Turks to be wary of most
groups outside of Turkey, including Westerners and Arabs as their immediate
neighbors. Among the other societal splits which are presented, Haynes cites
extremely unequal gender relations and overall ambivalent beliefs about
democracy as being contributing factors to the insular dynamics of the Turkish
state.30
Haynes argues that Turkey can’t be classified as a conservative religious
country due to its unique circumstances and history which have created deep
internal divisions and skepticism of foreigners. In the aftermath of World War I,
the division of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire among the victorious
European powers left Turkey in fear of foreign intervention over its internal
ethnic tensions with the Kurdish minority. The long history of Islam in Turkey
has also divided society between the religions population and the secular military
and political elites. Even as it is engaged in holding together the careful balance
within Turkey, the secular government has attempted to strengthen its political
and economic ties with the West while simultaneously upholding the conservative
Turkish cultural history.31
As a result of this unique historical background, Haynes concludes that
attempts to label the AKP as an Islamist party within Turkey are influenced
primarily by the Turkish fear of Islamist governance. Foreign perspectives hope to
label the AKP as an Islamist party in order to paint Turkey as being
fundamentally in conflict with Western and European values necessary to join the
EU. In spite of the many divisions in Turkey, however, Haynes believes that
Turkey is slowly progressing toward a democratic system of governance and
another military takeover is unlikely. So long as its security is ensured, the
Turkish people will continue confronting internal and external pressures through
democratic means, necessitating cooperation and competition between the three
primary ideological camps in Turkish society.32
In providing a fuller explanation of the ways in which internal and
external pressures have combined to create public policy and affect the
development of Turkish civil religion, Arat examines the many intersections
between religion and politics during the past decade under the AKP, pointing out
29

Ibid., 314-316.
Ibid., 317-321.
31
Ibid., 322-323.
32
Ibid., 324-325.
30
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the problems inherent to democratic society in Turkey, mainly threats to gender
equality, even as huge strides are being made with regard to religious liberty and
freedom. 33 The specific area of gender equality that she looked at was the
opportunities available to women in society outside of the home. In broadening
her analysis beyond simply the lifting of the headscarf ban at universities, she
hopes to uncover ways in which state bureaucracy is being used to disenfranchise
women with patriarchal religious values in Turkish society.
Arat points to the secularization of Turkey as the initial event allowing
women’s liberation by adopting Western norms and a new civil code modeled
after the Swiss Civil Code prohibiting polygyny, placing marriage under secular
rather than religious law, and placing men and women on equal footing for
inheritance. Further, the secular revolution established secular control over
education and religion in Turkey to promote the interests of the new state. Under
the new order, women in positions of authority took the opportunity to adopt
Western dress and customs until the rise of democracy in the 1950s presented a
new and significant religious influence on society. With increasing
democratization, she points to a return to old Islamic norms such as prayers being
held in Arabic and the establishment of religious schools teaching traditional
Islamic values.34
In their rise to power, the AKP moderated their Islamist influences to
build a broader coalition until they achieved almost 50% of the vote in July of
2007. With a larger power base built on more moderate votes, the party was able
to attempt to push through constitutional changes which returned to Islamic
values such as allowing headscarves to be worn publically.35 Arat also identifies
many other instances where AKP politicians and bureaucrats have used positions
of authority to strengthen Islamic norms. This is of concern to her because of the
role the state plays in socializing the youth. She argues that the patriarchal norms
being taught attribute a secondary status to women, depriving them of many of the
liberties they have under the secular system.36
Arat concludes by clarifying the difference between Islamist parties
reestablishing patriarchal societal norms and secular and feminist groups pushing
for freedom of religious practice. Where state-established religious norms are a
step backward for secularism and liberalism in Turkish society by
disenfranchising women and forcing them back into the home, freedom of
religion as supported by many feminists and secular groups helps to advance
Islam without patriarchal values. By encouraging free practice of religion and
33

Yesim Arat, "Religion, Politics and Gender Equality in Turkey: implications of a democratic
paradox?," Third World Quarterly 31, no. 6 (2010): 869-870.
34
Ibid., 870-872.
35
Ibid., 872.
36
Ibid., 872-873.
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resisting patriarchal domination, religious heritage and equal rights can both be
preserved and strengthened.37
In examining the way those intersections play out in Turkish society,
Hassan looks at the role secularization has had to play in creating a class of statesponsored female preachers by successively expanding access to education and
limiting the options available with certain education. Ever since the declaration of
the Turkish Republic, the Directorate of Religious Affairs has handled religious
matters in Turkey and at the present time one-third of its preachers are women
who take part in religious duties.38
The surprising number of female preachers can be traced back to the initial
efforts to secularize Turkey by promoting equal educational opportunities for
boys and girls, while simultaneously cutting out huge sections of the religious
education which had been common under the Ottoman Empire. Closing all
religious schools, the new secular regime set up a few new religious schools to
train prayer leaders and preachers through high school and university levels.
Initially open only to males, these schools were closed down over the next few
decades as religious instruction across the country also declined significantly from
23% of classroom time at all levels to only 2% of classroom time in the fourth,
fifth, and sixth grades.39
As Turkey democratized moving into the 1940s and 1950s, opportunities
for religious education were once again provided to gain popular support for the
government and its alliances with Western powers. As enrollment in religious
schools was extended to female students, their enrollment numbers increased
dramatically, as well as their continuation to the university level to study
theology. With further reforms of the educational system, limitations were put in
place restricting students of religious schools from studying subjects other than
theology at the university level, decreasing the number of males who enrolled in
religious schools, increasing the proportion of females.40
Women graduating in theology were left with possible career choices of
either teaching at a religious school or working for the state bureaucracy at the
Directorate of Religious Affairs, where they were often given jobs as female
preachers with responsibilities of leading services for women at mosques, or
giving more informal talks to mixed-gender audiences at community centers and
other public settings. The number of female preachers has remained stable but
low, and their work is often unknown even to other employees of the Directorate
37

Ibid., 878-882.
Mona Hassan, "Women at the Intersection of Turkish Politics, Religion, and Education: The
Unexpected Path to Becoming a State-Sponsored Female Preacher," Comparative Islamic
Studies 5, no. 1 (2009): 111-113.
39
Ibid., 113-114.
40
Ibid., 114-120.
38
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of Religious Affairs or to community members at a mosque that doesn’t have a
female preacher on staff.41
Though their position in Turkish society may seem to go against the
central tenets of Islam and the secularization of Turkey, female preachers are an
important piece in the state’s control over religious practice, ensuring that the
state’s version of Islam is taught to and understood by the population, rather than
popular and unauthorized religious beliefs. Though they have come to play an
important role in Turkish society, these positions for female preachers were
created as a result of policies aimed at secularization of society, rather than
expanding educational access.42

III. Analysis
Whereas France was influenced by the Enlightenment ideas during the French
Revolution and development of laïcité, the Turkish experience was characterized
by lacking those same intellectual influences. The resulting civil religion, while
central to Turkish society, was not used as the justification of broad social reforms
in the same way as laïcité was in France. The military’s role in supporting laiklik
has created divisions in society as a whole as well as in the feminist movement,
resulting in varying prescriptions for how Turkey should advance into the next
century as the next generation comes to power and the time of Atatürk becomes
more of a memory.
In the past decade, the tide of public opinion in Turkey has begun to swing
away from supporting the active secularization policies of the state, and the rise of
more religious parties such as the AKP has placed external pressure on the system
to adapt.43 The military is perhaps the most important institution to understand in
studying Turkish civil religion, as it has served as the guardian of the secular
constitution, and has been the most stable institution since the time of Atatürk.
Due to its insular nature, the military has long been the stronghold of Kemalist
ideals and has a strong dedication to laiklik. While the military has actively
overthrown the government on three separate occasions, it seems its “soft coup”
in 1997 when it called for the resignation of the sitting government indicates that
it is taking a step away from actively affecting political life. While the AKP
government which has ruled since 2003 has claimed to support democratic values,
its history as an Islamist party has the military and other secular groups worried.44

41

Ibid., 120-126.
Ibid., 126.
43
Warhola and Bezci, 428.
44
Ibid., 430-433.
42
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The military’s role as an outside defender of secularism has always caused
tension with the sitting civilian government, but reforms pursued by the AKP and
the coalition government which preceded it have weakened the power the military
can exert over society.45 In attempting to meet the conditions for membership in
the EU by exerting greater civilian control over the military, elected governments
have pushed back against the military at the same time as Islam is going through a
popular resurgence among the greater population. In cracking down on military
plans for a coup and weakening the military’s authority in society, the AKP
government has moved to shift the definition of laiklik within Turkish civil
religion to include an element of popular democracy while still respecting the
fundamentally secular character of the system.46 The argument can also be made
that with most Turks accepting secularism at a fundamental level, it is possible to
advance toward a more prosperous society which may participate in religion at a
personal level rather than at the behest of the state.47
Another vital element to understand in evaluating the recent evolution of
Turkish civil religion is the EU accession process, which requires Turkey to
broadly accept and implement the canon of EU law, including the need for a
robust democracy.48 By classifying Turkey as an official candidate for EU
member status, the conflict between Kemalism in Turkey and liberalism has come
to light in Turkey’s attempt to gain membership where Kemalism favored
secularism as an end and European liberalism used it as a means to an end.49 The
combination of those internal and external pressures is creating an environment in
which the state has stepped back from an active promotion of secularization to a
passive support of secularization. The government’s control of political,
educational and religious outlets within Turkey has enabled it to shape the
character of the Turkish population according to its wishes, leading to the present
situation where the population seems to be pushing to maintain the fundamental
character of laiklik even as they push for greater religious liberty.50

45

Ibid., 435-436.
Ibid., 438.
47
Ibid., 442-444.
48
Ibid., 448-449.
49
Kivanc Ulusoy, "The European Impact on State-Religion Relations in Turkey: Political Islam,
Alevis and Non-Muslim Minorities," Australian Journal of Political Science 46, no. 3 (September
2011): 411-412.
50
Warhola and Bezci, 452-453.
46
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IV. Conclusion
In examining the way civil religion has been used in Turkey, the evidence appears
to support the hypothesis that forces of secularism have been used to advance
state interests rather than due to any particular concern with democratic ideals or
the promotion of women’s rights. Early developments of secularism helped to
equalize Turkish society, but the state’s secularization efforts have been directed
not at further equalizing the society and expanding the rights of citizens, but
toward building a population which agrees with its secular ideals. While Turkish
civil religion shares many structural and doctrinal similarities with French civil
religion, the latter’s inclusion of enlightenment ideals allowed it to progress
further and advance the society as a whole. By taking on the autocratic character
of Kemalism, Turkish civil religion has divided the society and created odd
alliances between conservative Islamists and liberal democrats in opposing
blanket secularization.
Recent electoral success by conservatives has led many to speculate that
reforms put in place during the process of secularizing Turkey might be rejected.
While attempts have been made to roll back some reforms, the largest impact of
the governing AKP has been to increase civilian control over the military and
promote an ideology of soft secularization in order to continue on the path to EU
membership. Even in this endeavor, however, secularization efforts are being
undertaken in the interest of improving state cohesion by using the education
system to shape coming generations, and in the interest of gaining EU
membership and all of the political and economic benefits that would come along
with it.
While some educational opportunities have been afforded to women,
educational achievement for women has been more difficult in comparison to the
system under the Ottoman Empire. In the model promoted by secular civil
religion, religious schools were steadily closed, and women were only able to
attend them as they reopened as a side-effect of government policies to train statesponsored preachers and clerics to continue the process of educating the public
with the approved version of Islam. As feminist movements continue to change
Turkish society however, the goals and effects of the civil religion are likely to
adapt to the new realities.
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